BIO/CV
Assistant Professor of Economics at ITAM. Ph.D. in Economics (Penn State).
Working Papers
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach with Takashi Ui
Does rational inattention create endogenous volatility in large economies?
Information Acquisition and Free-Riding in Elections with Opinion Polls with Andrei Gomberg
Opinion polls encourage voters to learn about elections and help them elect the correct alternative.
Two-Sided Markets and Restricted Boltzmann Machines with Romans Pancs
Two-sided market models are formally equivalent to restricted Boltzmann machines, a neural network.
Bargaining and Information Acquisition with Kalyan Chatterjee and Miaomiao Dong
R&R at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
A buyer can extract the full surplus from a seller with bargaining power if the buyer has cheap access to information.
Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic with Henrique De Oliveira
If the cost of information makes a value function recursive then the cost must be entropic.
Enforcement against Organized Crime Increases Organized Fraud: Evidence from the Yakuza with Takuma Kamada
Enforcement on the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has increased organized crime.
Rational Inattention in Games
To be subsumed by the following two papers:
Robustness of Equilibria to Information Acquisition
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach, with Takashi Ui.
Publications
Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty
A principal can persuade multiple agents to take generalized risk-dominant actions by manipulating their higher-order beliefs.
Third-Party Policing Approaches against Organized Crime: An Evaluation of the Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances with Takuma Kamada
Third-party policing against the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has weakened the yakuza.
Repeated Coordination with Private Learning with Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Omer Tamuz
While playing a repeated coordination game, players commonly learn a state and also can coordinate efficiently.
Contact
E-mail: tetsuya.hoshino [at] itam.mx
Office: Av. Camino Santa Teresa #930, Col. Héroes de Padierna, Del. Magdalena Contreras, C.P. 10700 México, D.F.