Working Papers

Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach with Takashi Ui

• • Slides

  • Does rational inattention create endogenous volatility in large economies?

Information Acquisition and Free-Riding in Elections with Opinion Polls with Andrei Gomberg

• • Slides

  • Opinion polls encourage voters to learn about elections and help them elect the correct alternative.

Two-Sided Markets and Restricted Boltzmann Machines with Romans Pancs

• Preprint

• Two-sided market models are formally equivalent to restricted Boltzmann machines, a neural network.

Bargaining and Information Acquisition with Kalyan Chatterjee and Miaomiao Dong

• R&R at American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

• Preprint

• A buyer can extract the full surplus from a seller with bargaining power if the buyer has cheap access to information.

Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic with Henrique De Oliveira

• • Slides

  • If the cost of information makes a value function recursive then the cost must be entropic.

Enforcement against Organized Crime Increases Organized Fraud: Evidence from the Yakuza with Takuma Kamada

• • Preprint

  • Enforcement on the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has increased organized crime.

Rational Inattention in Games

• • JMP version • JMP slides

  • To be subsumed by the following two papers:

    • Robustness of Equilibria to Information Acquisition

    • Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach, with Takashi Ui.

Publications

Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty

• • International Economic Review (2022)    

  • Preprint

  • A principal can persuade multiple agents to take generalized risk-dominant actions by manipulating their higher-order beliefs.

Third-Party Policing Approaches against Organized Crime: An Evaluation of the Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances with Takuma Kamada

• • Journal of Quantitative Criminology (2021)

  • Preprint

  • Third-party policing against the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has weakened the yakuza.

Repeated Coordination with Private Learning with Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Omer Tamuz

• • Journal of Economic Theory (2020)

  • Preprint • Slides

  • While playing a repeated coordination game, players commonly learn a state and also can coordinate efficiently.