Assistant Professor of Economics at ITAM. Ph.D. in Economics (Penn State).
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach (with Takashi Ui) [30-min Slides]
Does rational inattention create endogenous volatility in large economies (#agents → ∞)?
This paper subsumes a part of my JMP.
Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic (to be joint work with Henrique De Oliveira) [Slides]
What kind of information cost makes the value function recursive?
Rational Inattention in Games [JMP version, JMP slides]
Which equilibrium is robust to a small misspecification of players' cost of information acquisition?
This paper is subsumed by the following two papers:
On the robustness of equilibria to endogenous information acquisition.
On a "physics" approach to economic models (to be joint work with Takashi Ui).
Bargaining and Information Acquisition (with Kalyan Chatterjee and Miaomiao Dong)
Does a buyer with cheap access to information get a surplus from a seller with full bargaining power?
Communication, Censorship, and Coordination
Does communication with or without censorship help players coordinate?
Enforcement against Organized Crime Increases Organized Fraud (with Takuma Kamada)
Did enforcement on the yakuza (criminal organizations in Japan) increase organized crime?
Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty
Can a principal persuade multiple agents to take particular actions by manipulating their higher-order beliefs?
Third-Party Policing Approaches against Organized Crime (with Takuma Kamada)
Did third-party policing against the yakuza (criminal organizations in Japan) weaken them?
Repeated Coordination with Private Learning (with Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Omer Tamuz) [Slides]
Does common learning occur in a repeated coordination game with observable actions? Can players eventually coordinate?
A Note on the Derivative of a Spectral Norm
On the gradient formula of a spectral norm (often used to train neural networks)
E-mail: tetsuya.hoshino [at] itam.mx
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