BIO/CV
Assistant Professor of Economics at ITAM. Ph.D. in Economics (Penn State).
Working Papers
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach (with Takashi Ui)
Does rational inattention create endogenous volatility in large economies?
Elections with Opinion Polls: Information Acquisition and Aggregation (with Andrei Gomberg)
Opinion polls encourage voters to learn about elections and help them make the correct decision.
Two-Sided Markets and Restricted Boltzmann Machines (with Romans Pancs)
We formally relate two-sided markets to neural networks of Restricted Boltzmann Machines, importing machine-learning tools.
Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic (with Henrique De Oliveira)
If the cost of information makes a value function recursive then the cost must be entropic.
Enforcement against Organized Crime Increases Organized Fraud: Evidence from the Yakuza (with Takuma Kamada)
Enforcement on the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has increased organized crime.
Rational Inattention in Games
To be subsumed by the following two papers:
Robustness of Equilibria to Information Acquisition
Rational Inattention and Endogenous Volatility: A Large Deviation Approach, with Takashi Ui.
Publications
Bargaining and Information Acquisition (with Kalyan Chatterjee and Miaomiao Dong)
A buyer can extract the full surplus from a seller with bargaining power if the buyer has cheap access to information.
Multi-Agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty
A principal can persuade multiple agents to take risk-dominant actions by manipulating their higher-order beliefs.
Third-Party Policing Approaches against Organized Crime: An Evaluation of the Yakuza Exclusion Ordinances (with Takuma Kamada)
Third-party policing against the yakuza (Japanese crime syndicates) has weakened the yakuza.
Repeated Coordination with Private Learning (with Pathikrit Basu, Kalyan Chatterjee, and Omer Tamuz)
While playing a repeated coordination game, players commonly learn a state and also can coordinate efficiently.
Contact
E-mail: tetsuya.hoshino [at] itam.mx
Office: Av. Camino Santa Teresa #930, Col. Héroes de Padierna, Del. Magdalena Contreras, C.P. 10700 México, D.F.