Does rational inattention create endogenous volatility in large economies (#agents → ∞)?
This paper subsumes a part of my JMP.
What kind of information cost makes the value function recursive?
Which equilibrium is robust to a small misspecification of players' cost of information acquisition?
This paper is subsumed by the following two papers:
Robustness of equilibria to endogenous information acquisition.
"Physics" approach to economic models (to be joint work with Takashi Ui).
Does a buyer with cheap access to information get a surplus from a seller with full bargaining power?
Communication, Censorship, and Coordination
Does communication with or without censorship help players coordinate?
Did enforcement on the yakuza (criminal organizations in Japan) increase organized crime?
Can a principal persuade multiple agents to take particular actions by manipulating their higher-order beliefs?
Did third-party policing against the yakuza (criminal organizations in Japan) weaken them?
Does common learning occur in a repeated coordination game with observable actions? Can players eventually coordinate?
E-mail: tetsuya.hoshino [at] itam.mx
Office: Av. Camino Santa Teresa #930, Col. Héroes de Padierna, Del. Magdalena Contreras, C.P. 10700 México, D.F.