

# Recursive Rational Inattention Is Entropic

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
AMES 2022



Information allows DM to make a better decision



Information may consume DM's attention





DM balances the **benefit** and **cost**

DM acquires costly information about a payoff-relevant state before choosing an action

$$\mathbb{E} \left[ \text{utilities} - \text{information costs} \right]$$

DM acquires costly information about a payoff-relevant state before choosing an action

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How should we model the costs?

cost function

preference/choice

cost function

preference/choice

What cost function satisfies desirable properties?

- Sims (2003)
- Bloedel–Zhong (2021)
- Hebert–Woodford (2020)
- Pomatto–Strack–Tamuz (2022)

cost function

preference/choice

What cost function rationalizes given preference/choice?

- Caplin–Dean (2015)
- Caplin–Dean–Leahy (2022)
- De Oliveora–Denti–Mihm–Ozbek (2017)
- De Oliveora (2017)
- Denti (2022)

cost function

preference/choice

static

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cost function

preference/choice

static


dynamic

What cost functions make the value functions **recursive**?


What costs allow us to use the dynamic programming?

# Example: Entropic Costs

Main Result



Time is discrete:  $t = 0, 1, 2, \dots$



Nature draws a state  $\theta_0$  according to a prior  $\pi$

- DM does **not** observe a state realization  $\theta_0$

DM learns a **costly signal**  $x_0$  about  $\theta_0$


- DM chooses distributions  $p_0(a_0 | \theta_0) \in \Delta(A)$  of **action recommendations**  $a_0$
- DM takes the recommended action  $a_0$

Payoff  $u_0(\theta_0, a_0)$  is realized

- DM observes the payoff  $u_0 \equiv u_0(\theta_0, a_0)$

In today's talk, I focus on a "direct" signal  $a_0$  rather than an arbitrary signal  $x_0$

At the end of time 0 (= the beginning of time 1), DM knows a decision node  $z^1 = (a_0, u_0)$



Nature draws a state  $\theta_1$  according to a prior  $\pi(\cdot | \theta_0)$

- DM does **not** observe a state realization  $\theta^1 = (\theta_0, \theta_1)$

DM learns an **action recommendation**  $a_1$

- DM chooses distributions  $p_1(a_1 | \theta^1, z^1) \in \Delta(A)$
- DM takes the recommended action  $a_1$

Payoff  $u_1(\theta^1, a^1)$  is realized

- DM observes the payoff  $u_1 \equiv u_1(\theta^1, a^1)$

At the end of time 1 (= the beginning of time 2), DM knows a decision node  $z^2 = (a^1, u^1)$

The **entropic cost** is linear in the mutual information  $I$ :

$$(\text{unit cost } \lambda) \times I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}_t \mid z^{t-1})$$

The **mutual information**  $I$  quantifies the “amount of information” about states  $\boldsymbol{\theta}^t$  that DM obtains from observing signal  $\mathbf{a}_t$  conditional on  $z^{t-1}$

Formally

$$I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}_t \mid z^{t-1}) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{a}_t} \left[ H(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t \mid z^{t-1}) - H(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t \mid z^{t-1}, \mathbf{a}_t) \right]$$

where entropy  $H$  is a measure of uncertainty:

$$H(\mathbf{w}) = - \sum_{\mathbf{w}} \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{w}) \log \mathbb{P}(\mathbf{w})$$

$$\max \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t) - \lambda I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}_t \mid z^{t-1}) \right) \right]$$

No discounting (for simplicity)  
•  $\sum_t u_t$  must be well-defined

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By the properties of the entropic costs  
 the dynamic problem is reduced to a  
 collection of static problems

$$\max \mathbb{E} \left[ \left( u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}} \left[ V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}, \mathbf{z}^t) \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t \right] \right) - \lambda I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1} \right]$$

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E} \left[ u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}} [V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}, \mathbf{z}^t) \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t] - \lambda I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{x}_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1} \right]$$

The logit-like solution:

$$p_t(a_t \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \propto q_t(a_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \exp \left[ \frac{u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, a_t) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}} [V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}, \mathbf{z}^t) \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t]}{\lambda} \right]$$

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E} \left[ u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}} [V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}, \mathbf{z}^t) \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t] - \lambda I(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{x}_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1} \right]$$

The **default rule**  $q_t(a_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^t} [p_t(a_t \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}]$  is the unconditional choice probability consistent with  $p_t$

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
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The **log-sum-exp** value function:


$$V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) = \lambda \log \sum_{a_t} q_t(a_t \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}) \exp \left[ \frac{u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, a_t) + \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}_{t+1}} [V(\boldsymbol{\theta}^{t+1}, \mathbf{z}^t) \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t]}{\lambda} \right]$$

Entropic Cost



Recursive Value

Entropic Cost



some assumption

Recursive Value

## Choice-based recursivity:

$$\text{stage payoff} = \text{utility}(\theta^t, a^t) + \mathbb{E}[\text{value}(\theta^t, z^t)]$$

Steiner–Stewart–Matějka (2017)

## Belief-based recursivity:

$$\text{stage payoff} = \text{utility}(\theta^t, a^t) + \mathbb{E}[\text{value}(\text{belief})]$$

Miao–Xing (2020) study this DP,  
focusing on “Markov” environments

Example: Entropic Costs

**Main Result**

An **environment**  $E$  consists of:

- $\theta = (\theta_0, \theta_1, \dots)$  is a stochastic process:  $\theta \sim \pi$ 
  - $\pi$  is a prior probability measure
- $a = (a_0, a_1, \dots)$  is a stochastic process:  $a \sim q$ 
  - $q$  is a default rule
- $u = (u_0, u_1, \dots)$  is payoff functions
- No discounting (for simplicity)
  - $\sum_t u_t$  must be well-defined

This default rule  $q$  "should" be endogenous but in today's talk, we will take it as given.

How do we define the value of an environment  $E$ ?

1. Transform  $E$  to a default random utility...

A "plain" definition is...

$$\text{value}(E) = \max \mathbb{E} \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( u_t(\theta^t, a^t) - \text{cost}(\theta^t, x_t \mid z^{t-1}) \right) \right]$$

- ... is defined by  $(\pi, q)$

2. Definition of  $\mathbb{V}[E]$  is hard to work with...

- $\mathbb{V}[E]$  is an abstract formulation of the value of  $E$

How do we define the value of an environment  $E$ ?

1. Transform  $E$  to a **default random utility**:

$$\mathbf{U} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t)$$

- The random vector  $(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{a})$  follow the joint distributions induced by  $(\pi, q)$
2. Define a value functional  $\mathbb{V} : \{\text{default random utilities } \mathbf{U}\} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ 
    - $\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}]$  is an abstract formulation of the value of  $E$

**Control-problem interpretation:** how to control a process  $(u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t))_t$

- DM controls actions against random states
- control costs depend on the deviation from the default rule  $q$

Static rational inattention with entropic costs

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E} \left[ u(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{a}) - \lambda I(\boldsymbol{\theta}, \mathbf{x}) \right]$$

Value at state  $\boldsymbol{\theta}$

$$\lambda \log \sum_a q(a) \exp \left\{ \frac{u(\boldsymbol{\theta}, a)}{\lambda} \right\}$$

# Why the Value Functional?

Static rational inattention with entropic costs

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Risk-loving CARA utility

$$u^\gamma(z) = \exp\{\gamma z\}$$

Certainty-equivalent of exogenous  $\mathbf{w}$

$$\frac{1}{\gamma} \log \mathbb{E} \left[ \exp\{\gamma \mathbf{w}\} \right]$$

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Certainty-equivalent of exogenous  $\mathbf{w}$

We use finance techniques to study RI models (with non-entropic costs)

## Rational inattention

- exogenous  $\boldsymbol{\theta}$
- endogenous  $\mathbf{a}$

## Finance

- exogenous  $\mathbf{w}$
- **risk-aversion** in the literature

A value functional  $\mathbb{V}$  is **recursive** if:

- for an environment  $E$  at time 0

$$\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] = \mathbb{V} \left[ u_0(\boldsymbol{\theta}^0, \mathbf{a}^0) + \mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^0, \mathbf{z}^0] \right]$$

A value functional  $\mathbb{V}$  is **recursive** if:

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$$\begin{array}{c} \text{dynamic} \\ \mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] \end{array} = \begin{array}{c} \text{static} \\ \mathbb{V} \left[ \underbrace{u_0(\boldsymbol{\theta}^0, \mathbf{a}^0)}_{\text{present utility}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^0, \mathbf{z}^0]}_{\text{future}} \right] \end{array}$$

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Recursivity at time  $t$ :

$$\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U} \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1}] = \mathbb{V} \left[ u_t(\boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{a}^t) + \mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^t, \mathbf{z}^t] \mid \mathbf{z}^{t-1} \right]$$

How can we compare two environments  $E$  and  $\tilde{E}$ ?

- Compare the default random utilities  $\mathbf{U}$  and  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}}$

The value functional  $\mathbb{V}$  is **monotone** if

- If  $\mathbf{U} \succsim_{\text{FOSD}} \tilde{\mathbf{U}}$  regardless of a state, then "value of  $\mathbf{U} \geq$  value of  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}}$ "
- If  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \succsim_{\text{FOSD}} \mathbf{U}$  regardless of a state, then "value of  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \geq$  value of  $\mathbf{U}$ "

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Required only for a **simple** environment  $\tilde{E}$  such that

$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t \tilde{\mathbf{a}}_t - \eta)$$

random walk


Time-0:

- payoff  $\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_0)$  is independent of action  $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}_0$


Time- $t \geq 1$ :

- binary states:  $\tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t = \pm 1$
- binary actions:  $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}_t = \pm 1$
- stage payoffs:  $\epsilon \tilde{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_t \tilde{\mathbf{a}}_t - \eta$  for some  $\eta$
- it ends at a bounded stopping time  $\tau$

$\mathbb{V}$  is monotone and recursive



$\mathbb{V}$  has the log-sum-exp formula




$\mathbb{V}$  has the entropic costs

$\mathbb{V}$  is monotone and recursive



$\mathbb{V}$  has the log-sum-exp formula

Today's focus



$\mathbb{V}$  has the entropic costs

If the value functional  $\mathbb{V}$  is monotone and recursive then there is some  $\lambda > 0$  such that

$$\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] = \mathbb{E}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}^0} \left[ \lambda \log \sum_{a_0} q_0(a_0) \exp \left[ \frac{u_0(\boldsymbol{\theta}^0, a^0) + \mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U} \mid \boldsymbol{\theta}^0, z^0]}{\lambda} \right] \right]$$

If the value functional  $\mathbb{V}$  is monotone and recursive then there is some  $\lambda > 0$  such that

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Time- $t$  result is analogous

How to evaluate the value  $\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}]$  of the default random utility  $\mathbf{U}$  induced from an env.  $E$ ?

- Approximate  $\mathbf{U}$  with a random walk  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}}$  (for each possible state)

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$$\mathbf{U} |_{\theta_0} \lesssim_{\text{FOSD}} \tilde{\mathbf{U}} |_{\tilde{\theta}_0}$$

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$$\mathbf{U} |_{\theta_0} \preceq_{\text{FOSD}} \tilde{\mathbf{U}} |_{\tilde{\theta}_0}$$

monotonicity 

$$\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] \leq \mathbb{V}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}}]$$

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monotonicity 

= 0 by **recursivity** for some  $\eta$

$$\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] \leq \mathbb{V}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)] + \mathbb{V}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)\right]$$

$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

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monotonicity 

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$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

$$\approx \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{\gamma} \log \mathbb{E}[e^{\gamma \mathbf{U}} | \theta_0]\right]$$

by the **connection to CARA**

How to evaluate the value  $\mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}]$  of the default random utility  $\mathbf{U}$  induced from an env.  $E$ ?

- Approximate  $\mathbf{U}$  with a random walk  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}}$  (for each possible state)

$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}}' |_{\tilde{\theta}_0} \preceq_{\text{FOSD}} \mathbf{U} |_{\theta_0} \preceq_{\text{FOSD}} \tilde{\mathbf{U}} |_{\tilde{\theta}_0}$$

monotonicity 

$$\mathbb{V}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}}'] \leq \mathbb{V}[\mathbf{U}] \leq \mathbb{V}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)] + \mathbb{V}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)\right] = 0 \text{ by } \text{recursivity} \text{ for some } \eta$$

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$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}}' |_{\tilde{\theta}_0} \preceq_{\text{FOSD}} \mathbf{U} |_{\theta_0} \preceq_{\text{FOSD}} \tilde{\mathbf{U}} |_{\tilde{\theta}_0} \longleftarrow \text{Kupper-Schachermayer-Skorokhod Embedding Theorem (modified version)}$$

monotonicity  $\downarrow$


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$$\approx \mathbb{E}\left[\frac{1}{\gamma} \log \mathbb{E}[e^{\gamma \mathbf{U}} | \theta_0]\right]$$

by the **connection to CARA**

Entropic Cost



Monotonicity

Recursive Value

Approximate the default random utility  $\mathbf{U}$  of a static environment  $E$  by a random walk:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

How can we find such a “nice”  $\tilde{\mathbf{U}}$ ?

- For any small  $\epsilon$ , we have three parameters of choice
  - the drift parameter  $\eta$
  - the stopping time  $\tau$
  - the initial value  $\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)$  for each  $\tilde{\theta}_0$

$$\tilde{U} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

How to find the drift parameter  $\eta$

- “value at time  $t \geq 1$ ” = 0
- fee  $\eta$  = “value of the game to match action  $a_t$  with state  $\theta_t$ ”

$$\eta = \mathbb{V}[\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_1 \tilde{a}_1]$$

The **martingale-ish** property:

$$\mathbb{V}[\tilde{U}] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)] + \mathbb{V}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)\right] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)]$$

# Drift Parameter and Martingale-ish Property

$$\tilde{U} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

How to find the drift parameter  $\eta$

- “value at time  $t \geq 1$ ” = 0
- fee  $\eta$  = “value of the game to match action  $a_t$  with state  $\theta_t$ ”

$$\eta = \mathbb{V}[\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_1 \tilde{a}_1]$$

The **martingale-ish** property:

$$\mathbb{V}[\tilde{U}] = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)]}_{\text{exogenous}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{V}\left[\sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)\right]}_{= 0 \text{ by } \text{recursivity}} = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0)]$$





# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem

For a default random utility  $\mathbf{U}$ , we have a simple environment  $\tilde{E}$  with default random utility

$$\tilde{\mathbf{U}} = \tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0) + \sum_{t=1}^{\tau} (\epsilon \tilde{\theta}_t \tilde{a}_t - \eta)$$

such that for each  $\theta_0$

- $\mathbf{U} |_{\theta_0} \approx \tilde{\mathbf{U}} |_{\tilde{\theta}_0}$
- $\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0) \approx (u^\gamma)^{-1}(\mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) | \theta_0])$

# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem


$\mathbf{U}$  takes either value  $\underline{u} < \bar{u}$

- the initial value

$$u^r(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0)) \approx \mathbb{E}[u^r(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0]$$

- the martingale property

$$\mathbb{E}[u^r(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = u^r(\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0))$$



# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem

$\mathbf{U}$  takes either value  $\underline{u} < \bar{u}$


- the initial value

$$u^\gamma(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0)) \approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0]$$

- the martingale property

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = u^\gamma(\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0))$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0] \\ \approx & \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] \end{aligned}$$



# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem


$\mathbf{U}$  takes either value  $\underline{u} < \bar{u}$

- the initial value

$$u^\gamma(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0)) \approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0]$$

- the martingale property

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = u^\gamma(\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0))$$



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0] &= \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \bar{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\bar{u}) + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \underline{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\underline{u}) \\ &\approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] \end{aligned}$$

# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem


$\mathbf{U}$  takes either value  $\underline{u} < \bar{u}$

- the initial value

$$u^\gamma(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0)) \approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0]$$

- the martingale property

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = u^\gamma(\tilde{u}_0(\tilde{\theta}_0))$$



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0] &= \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \bar{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\bar{u}) + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \underline{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\underline{u}) \\ &\approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \approx \bar{u} \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] u^\gamma(\bar{u}) + \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \approx \underline{u} \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] u^\gamma(\underline{u}) \end{aligned}$$

# Modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem


$\mathbf{U}$  takes either value  $\underline{u} < \bar{u}$

- the initial value

$$u^\gamma(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0)) \approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0]$$


- the martingale property

$$\mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] = u^\gamma(\tilde{u}(\tilde{\theta}_0))$$



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\mathbf{U}) \mid \theta_0] &= \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \bar{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\bar{u}) + \mathbb{P}[\mathbf{U} = \underline{u} \mid \theta_0] u^\gamma(\underline{u}) \\ \approx \mathbb{E}[u^\gamma(\tilde{\mathbf{U}}) \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] &= \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \approx \bar{u} \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] u^\gamma(\bar{u}) + \mathbb{P}[\tilde{\mathbf{U}} \approx \underline{u} \mid \tilde{\theta}_0] u^\gamma(\underline{u}) \end{aligned} \quad \longrightarrow \quad \mathbf{U} \mid_{\theta_0} \approx \tilde{\mathbf{U}} \mid_{\tilde{\theta}_0}$$

modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem



modified Kupper–Schachermayer–Skorokhod Embedding Theorem

